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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
KATHLEEN R. BARNES,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
*

vs.

APPEALS NUMBER 920608-CA

*

STEVEN LYN BARNES,
Defendant/Appellant.

*

Case Number 92-4900082 DA

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals is granted jurisdiction of this
matter pursuant to Rules 3(a) and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and Section 78-2a-3 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial District Court1s
award,

after

trial

of

the

matter,

of

custody

to

the

Plaintiff/Appellee, of alimony to the Plaintiff/Appellee and of the
division

of

the

Defendant/Appellant's

retirement

monies. The

Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presided at the divorce trial held
January 30, 1992 and January 31, 1992.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. The trial court awarded permanent custody of the parties'
three

(3)

minor

children

to

the

Plaintiff/Appellee.

The

Defendant/Appellant contends the award of custody was not based
upon the evidence presented at trial, is contrary to the best
interests of the minor children, and is not supported by adequate
findings of fact. The standard of review to be followed by the
1
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Court of Appeals is a determination that the best interests of the
child will be met by the custody award and a determination that the
award of custody is not a clesar abuse of discretion. Section
30-3-10 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, Paryzek v.
Paryzek. 776 P. 2d 78 ( Utah App. 1989) and Cumminas v. Cumminas.
175 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 ( Utah 1991) discuss the standard of review
in custody matters.
2. The trial court awarded the Plaintiff/Appellee permanent
alimony in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500.00) per month.
The Defendant/Appellant

contends the award of alimony to the

Plaintiff/Appellant is erroneous as the Plaintiff/Appellee did not
demonstrate any genuine need for alimony. Moreover, the award of
alimony to the Plaintiff/Appellee made it impossible for the
Defendant/Appellant to meet basic living expenses for himself. As
confirmed in Chambers v. Chambers, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. ( Utah
October 21, 1992) and Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d. 818 ( Utah
App.

1992)

the

appellate

standard

of

review

of

alimony

determinations is whether or not the award constituted a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion.
3.
reversed

The

trial

court,

without

justification,

its division of the Defendant/Appellant's

essentially
retirement

monies after ruling on post-divorce motions. The division of the
retirement monies failed

to take

into account

the allowable

expenditures from retirement monies and erroneously calculated the
amount of monies in existence on the date of the divorce trial. The
appellate court reviews the trial Court's property division to
2
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determine whether there was substantial and prejudicial error,
whether the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings or
if there was a clear abuse of discretion. Watson v. Watson, 194
Utah Adv. Rep. 42 ( Utah App. , August 24, 1992), Howell v. Howell,
806 P. 2d 1209 ( Utah App. 1991) and Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P. 2d
421 ( Utah App. 1990).
4. The trial court refused to allow the children and several
witnesses called by the Defendant/Appellant to testify regarding
the

children's

preference

for

permanent

custody.

The

Court

impermissibly excluded evidence impacting on the children's best
interests. Identification of a child's preference for custody and
the consequences for not doing so which constitute a clear abuse of
discretion are identified in Section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code
Annotated

1953,

as

amended,

Paryzek

v.

Paryzek,

supra,

and

Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 ( Utah 1982).
5. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law
were insufficient to support its resolution of custody, alimony,
and the division of the Defendant/Appellant's retirement monies. If
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous
they can not support a challenge upon appeal. Roberts v. Roberts,
835 P.2d 193 ( Utah App. 1992), Woodward v. Fazio, 175 Utah Adv.
Rep. ( Utah App. Dec. 1991) and Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
6. The trial court refused to grant the Defendant/Appellant a
new trial and refused to grant a hearing to resolve issues which
were not raised at trial. The rulings of the Court were arbitrary,
3
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prejudicial and partially necessitated this appeal. The failure to
grant the Defendant/Appellant's post-divorce motions including the
Motion for New Trial were a clear abuse of discretion. Rule 59(6)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Watson v. Watsonf supra.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a final Order of the Third Judicial
District Court resolving issues of custody, alimony, and the
division of retirement monies. The Defendant/Appellant filed posttrial motions for a new trial to stay the trial Court's decision
pending completion of the appellate process, and to reconsider
stated matters. Appeal is taken from the Court's denial of all the
Defendant/Appellant's post-trial motions.
1.

The parties were married on September 16, 1972.

2.

Three (3) children, Jamie Nicole, whose date of birth is

July 26, 1976, Adam Matthew, whose date of birth is March 29, 1979,
and Jennifer Morgan, whose date of birth is November 20, 1982 were
born of this marriage.
3.

The parties reconciled after an eighteen month separation

which terminated

approximately

two years prior to the final

separation, which culminated in the dissolution of this marriage.
During the initial separation, the Defendant/Appellant was the
primary caretaker for the peirties' minor children.
4.

Commissioner Peuler interviewed Jamie and Jennifer after

the hearing on the Plaintiff/Appellee's Order to Show Cause.
Commissioner Peuler's Minute Entry, dated January 22, 1991, awarded
the Defendant/Appellant temporary custody of the parties' minor

1
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children because he had been their primary caretaker during the
parties' previous extended separation.
5.

The Defendant/Appellant remained in the marital home and

provided the primary care for the minor children for over a year
until

the

Court

awarded

custody

of

the

children

to

the

Plaintiff/Appellee and ordered him to vacate the marital home. The
Plaintiff/Appellee provided limited supervision and care for the
minor children before school and after school.
6.

The Court selected Dr. Donald Strassberg to perform a

custody evaluation.

Dr. Strassberg determined that both parties

would be fine custodians for the minor children but that custody
should be awarded to the Plaintiff/Appellee.
7.

The Court initially, in the oral ruling, rendered at the

conclusion of the trial, ordered the parties divide the retirement
monies the Defendant/Appellant had at the time of the separation
after

making

deductions

for

expenditures

made

by

the

Defendant/Appellant during the parties' separation for marital
obligations.
8.

The

Court

awarded

the

Plaintiff/Appellee

permanent

alimony in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500.00) per month.
9.

The Defendant/Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial on

February 13, 1992. The rationale for the Motion for New Trial was
the Defendant/Appellant's belief the Court's decision on the issues
of custody and alimony were legally deficient and not supported by
the evidence presented at the trial.

The Court issued a Minute

Entry on February 20, 1992 denying the Defendant/Appellant's Motion

5.
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for New Trial.
10.

The parties could not agree upon the dollar amount of the

retirement

monies

Consequently,

the

to

be

divided

Defendant/Appellant

between
filed

the
a

parties.

Motion

Reconsideration of Unresolved Issues on February 24, 1992.
March

3, 1992, the Court

for
On

issued a Minute Entry denying the

Defendant/Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration of Unresolved
Issues.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Each parent

acknowledge

the

Defendant/Appellant

was the

primary caretaker of the parties7 three (3) children during each of
the parties' protracted separations.

The children thrived in the

Defendant/Appellant's care.
The Plaintiff/Appellee provided driving service back and forth
from school during the parties' second separation.

She even

testified at trial that she did fewer labors to benefit and assist
the minor children during the second separation than during the
time of the first separation, and that she was in the martial home
more during the first separation than during the second separation.
(T.31)
The Plaintiff/Appellee did very little to exercise her full
visitation rights.

She testified that she generally only elected

to see the children for a few hours one day each weekend and that
she had the children spend the entire weekend with her only once
during the entire second separation. (1.30,1.31, T.59)
The trial Court ignored the evidence at trial regarding the
&
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parenting capabilities of both parents, and without compelling
reasons to do so changed the stable, competent custodial situation
of the children.
The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law neither
accurately reflect the testimony given at trial nor give more than
conclusionary rationale, most of which are not supported by the
evidence for the Court's rulings on the issues of custody, alimony
and the division of the Defendant/Appellant's retirement monies.
The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are legally
deficient.
The Plaintiff/Appellee worked part-time during the majority of
the second separation.

There was absolutely no dispute that she

could have worked full time for her employer. (T.6, T.49)

The

Defendant/Appellant worked full time with little opportunity for
overtime.

The trial Court awarded permanent alimony to the

Plaintiff/Appellee

without requiring her to maximize her own

earning potential and in complete disregard of the financial
consequences to the Defendant/Appellant.

The Defendant/Appellant

is left without sufficient monies to meet basic living expenses
after payment of his child support and alimony obligations.
The

parties7

two

oldest

children

had

clear

preferences

regarding their permanent custody. The trial Court refused to hear
any testimony from any witness or from the children themselves
regarding their preferences for custody. These children, 16 years
and 13 years, respectively are capable of voicing a thoughtful and
wise choice of custodial parent, and believed that they had
7
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sufficient

reasons

Defendant/Appellant,

to

prefer

the

custody

of

the

The two older children hoped they would be

able to speak to Judge Frederick about their choice of custody
outside the presence of their parents.

When talking with the

children, Judge Frederick refused to ask either of the older
children if they had any opinion or preference regarding custody.
Apparently, he also did not introduce any general topic which would
allow the older children to take the initiative to articulate their
preferences. (T.192, T.193)
The failure of the trial Court to ascertain, much less place
any

reliance

upon

the

older

children's

considered

position

regarding custody, was contrary to a full examination of the
children's best interests.

The exclusion of competent testimony

clearly precluded a determination of custody designed to satisfy
the needs of the children.
The Defendant/Appellant received the monies in his retirement
account when there was a buy out of his employer. The parties made
expenditures of these marital monies during the period of their
reconciliation.

There was essentially no dispute about the amount

of monies in existence at the time of the parties' separation.
(T.18, T.140) The Defendant/Appellant further expended retirement
funds for marital and non-mcirital obligations during the parties'
separation. The trial Court ordered the parties' to divide equally
the retirement funds in existence at the time of the parties'
separation after making deductions for the expenditures to pay the
marital obligations. (T.200, T.201)
&
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Counsel for the Plaintiff/Appellee drafted proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law which indicated an amount the
Defendant/Appellant considered inaccurate. The trial Court denied
the objection to the erroneous provisions, and improperly modified
and upwardly adjusted the amount of retirement monies to be divided
between the parties. On February 19, 1992, the Defendant/Appellant
filed his Motion for Reconsideration of Unresolved Issues.

The

trial Court issued a Minute Entry dated March 3, 1992, which denied
the Defendant/Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration of Unresolved
Issues.
The trial Court ordered the division of the larger, initial
amount of retirement funds received by the Defendant/Appellant
rather than the funds existing at the time of the parties'
separation minus allowable deductions for the payment of marital
expenditures at the date of trial.

The Court executed Amended

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law addressing this issue which
are not supported by the evidence.
total

amount of monies received

The improper division of the
initially by the Defendant/

Appellant is contrary to the evidence presented at trial and is
tantamount to an unjust enrichment to the Plaintiff/Appellee.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES'
MINOR CHILDREN TO PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
A.

THE
TRIAL
COURT
FAILED
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S MORALS

TO

CONSIDER

THE

Section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code annotated 1953, as amended,
clearly mandates the trial Court evaluate each parent's morals as
SL
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a significant factor in considering an award of permanent custody.
The

Plaintiff/Appellee

testified

at

trial

that

she had

intimate affairs with men during each of the parties1 separation.
(T.54, T.57# T.60, T.69, T.70, T.72)

The termination of one,

probably two, of these relationships caused the Plaintiff/Appellee
to contemplate suicide.

(T.56, T.57, T.70# T.155, T.156, Ex 5)

The Defendant/Appellant testified that he believed it was
categorically wrong for a party to be intimate with another before
one's divorce was final. (T.122) He testified that he believed the
Plaintiff/Appellee's morals would preclude her from teaching good
morals to their children, and setting a good example for the
children. He believed her extramartial relationships often caused
her to make poor decisions, such as introducing the children of the
parties

to her male

friends, leaving the children with her

boyfriends or neglecting them to spend weekends with her boyfriend.
(T.60, T.122, T.123, T.126, T.129, T.160)
The Utah Court of Appeals has determined that a parents'
extramarital affairs do have a bearing upon that parent's fitness
to be awarded custody.

In Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah

App. 1990) at page 1177 the Appellate Court stated:
"Nor do we find that the trial Court abused its
discretion in considering Rachelle's sexual conduct in
making its custody decision. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(1)
(1989) provides that in custody determinations pursuant
to divorce, the trial Court "shall consider the best
interests of the child and the past conduct and
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties."
The statute has been construed to mean that parental
moral character is but one of numerous factors that the
trial Court may consider in determining the child's best
interest.
See Santerson v. Tryon. 739 P. 2d 623, 627
(Utah 1987.)"
10
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The Utah Courts do not appear to be willing to deviate from
consideration of a party's extramarital affairs when deliberating
the issue of permanent custody.

In Cumminas v. Cumminas, 175 Utah

Adv. Rep. 23, 26 (Utah Nov. 1991), the Appellate Court upheld the
lower court's award of custody to the father partially because of
emotional harm her children suffered because of her relationships
with men.
There was never any indication from any source that the
Defendant/Appellant had a single extramarital affair.

There was

never any suggestion that the loss of a lover would cause the
Defendant/Appellant to contemplate suicide and desert his children.
There was never any testimony to indicate the Defendant/Appellant
needed to validate himself by engaging in extramarital affairs or
that he had ever made his children secondary to an extramarital
partner.

Not only did the Plaintiff/Appellee choose to spend

weekends with her boyfriend over the time she was scheduled to
spend the time with her children, but as she reported to Dr.
Strassberg she discussed her extramarital affairs with her oldest
child, Jamie Nicole.

She believed the sharing of personal,

intimate matters enabled her to be more "like friends" with Jamie
than mother/daughter.

(Custody Evaluation of Dr. Strassberg)

The trial Court, in an absolute disregard of its discretion,
failed to consider the Plaintiff/Appellee's extramarital affairs
over parenting responsibilities, her abdication of traditional
mother/daughter interaction in order to be a friend rather than
parent to her oldest daughter, and the very definite negative
11
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impact of her extramarital affairs upon her children.

Clearly,

there was a noted and substantial difference between the morals of
these parents.

It is inconceivable that the trial Court believed

the parent with less exemplary morals, which she allowed to impact
in decisions regarding her children should be awarded custody of
the minor children.

The trial Court's award of custody to the

Plaintiff/Appellee should be reversed.
Dr. Strassberg testified that the Defendant/Appellant was
concerned about the Plaintiff/Appellee's relationship with her
biological father. (T.96)
Plaintiff/Appellee

The evaluation also testified that the

eventually terminated all contact with her

natural father when he indicated he wanted more intimacy with her.
(T.91, T.92)
Although there is no proof that the Plaintiff/Appellee ever
engaged in an incestuous relationship with her biological father,
there

is

every

indication

from

parties

who

knew

the

Plaintiff/Appellee and her father very well and even from the
Plaintiff/Appellee herself that their relationship was not typical
of

other

father/daughter

relationships

and

had

some

sexual

components. She maintained this relationship as an adult by her
voluntary election.

The Plaintiff/Appellee is, in the pictures

introduced into evidence and in the descriptions given by others,
seen to be willingly engaging in questionable physical contact with
her father.
It is hard to fathom that the Plaintiff/Appellee's judgment
would be deemed appropriate, wise, prudent or insightful in light
12
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of her relationships with boyfriends
Defendant/Appellant

or

Defendant/Appellant's

her

morals

during her marriage to

father.
and

Antithetically,

ability

to

form

relationships was never questioned or challenged.

the

healthy

It was clearly

an abuse of discretion for the trial Court to deprive the parent
who could provide mature, appropriate, morally defensible guidance
in the formation of future relationships of custody.

The award of

custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee should be reversed.
The Plaintiff/Appellee demonstrated that she would use deceit
to

ensure

her

own

happiness

even

consequences to her children.

if

it

meant

detrimental

The Plaintiff/Appellee removed

checks remitted by the Defendant/Appellant's insurance carrier,
which were made payable to the Defendant/Appellant,
marital home.

from the

Although these checks were issued as payments to

Jamie's health insurance providers, the Plaintiff/Appellee forged
the Defendant/Appellant's names to the checks and utilized the
funds for her own personal needs.
Plaintiff/Appellee

apparently

(T.51, T.138, T.139)

believed

it was

acceptable

The
and

appropriate for her to convert monies that were not her own to her
own wants rather than to work to pay her own bills.
The Plaintiff/Appellee went to the marital home when the
Defendant/Appellant was not home and removed the parties' camper
trailer.

She subsequently sold the camper trailer and kept the

sales proceeds for her own use. (T.135, T.136)

The sale of the

camper trailer eliminated the pleasure the children experienced in
their family camping trips. (T.136) Again, the Plaintiff/Appellee
13
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apparently believed it was appropriate and acceptable for her to
dispose of an asset enjoyed by the entire family and retain the
monies than to work to pay her own bills.
Evidence

at

trial,

even

from

the

Plaintiff/Appellee,

illustrated the questionable integrity of the Plaintiff/Appellee.
There is no plausible argument which could refute the contention
that a person's integrity is a component of their moral fitness.
Although Judge Frederick did not condone the Plaintiff/Appellee's
taking and utilization of assets for her personal needs, he did not
make any correlation between the Plaintiff/Appellee's lack of
integrity, her willingness to put her needs before the needs of her
children, and the statuary requirements of § 30-3-10(1) of the Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. The Court's failure to consider
the integrity of the Plaintiff/Appellee was clearly violation of
the mandates of the applicable statutes and controlling case law
such as Merriam, supra.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY
TEMPORARY CUSTODY AWARD.

IGNORED

THE

EXCELLENT

The Defendant/Appellant was unarguably the primary caretaker
for the parties' minor children nearly thirty months of the fiftyfour months which preceded the trial of this matter.

He was the

custodial parent and primary caretaker during the eighteen months
of the parties' first separation and the twelve months of the
parties' final separation.

(T.30, T.54, T.117, T.118, T.123) Dr.

Strassberg did not identify any harm or ill effects to the children
during the extensive times spent in the custody of their father.
Rather, the home maintained by the Defendant/Appellant and the
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

environment

therein

seemed

to

be

stable

and

structured

to

successfully meet the needs of all the children.
The stability of a temporary custody arrangement is one which
should not be changed except for compelling reasons. In Paryzek v.
Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 1989) at pages 81 and 82, the Court
stated:
"The
overriding
consideration
in
child
custody
determinations is the child's best interests. Hutchison
v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982). There are
several factors to be considered by the trial court in
awarding custody, some of which concern the child's
specific needs and others which relate to the parents'
characteristics.
Id.
at 41. However, providing a
stable home for a child and avoiding "ping pong" custody
awards are critical factors in custody disputes. Hoaae
v. Hoaae. 649 P. 2d 51, 53-54 (Utah 1982). There is a
"general interest in continuing previously determined
custody arrangements where the child is happy and well
adjusted." Hutchinson, 649 P.29 at 41. This interest in
stability has been the basis for requiring a substantial
change of circumstances as a precondition for reexamining
permanent custody awards. Id.; Kramer v. Kramer, 738
P.2d 624, 626 (Utah 1987); Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d
942, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Recently, however, in
Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, (1989), the Utah Supreme
Court held that the strict change of circumstances
requirements would not always apply in custody
modification proceedings.
Nonetheless, the court
emphasized the importance of relative permanence in
custody orders:
[I]f an existing custody arrangement is not
inimical to the child, the continuity and
stability of the arrangement are factors to be
weighted in determining a child's best
interests.
What particular weight to be
accorded those factors in a given case must
depend on the duration of the initial custody
arrangement, the age of the child, the nature
of the relationship that has developed between
the child and the custodial and noncustodial
parents, and how well the child is thriving
physically, mentally, and emotionally. A very
short custody arrangement of a few months,
even if nurturing to some extent, is not
entitled to as much weight as a similar
arrangement of substantial duration.
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Id, at 604. See also Mauahan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Notably, Elmer did not identify
the temporary versus permanent nature of the "initial
custody award" as one of the factors to be considered in
deciding how much weight to give "continuity and
stability."
The Elmer decision emphasized that the
paramount consideration must be promoting the child's
best interests, and it is irrelevant from the child's
perspective, how, as a legal matter, the existing
arrangement came about.
Other Utah Supreme Court cases have similarly held that
stability is a fundamental consideration in original
custody awards as well as in subsequent modifications.
In Pusey v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986), the
court stated that decisive factors in child custody
determinations should be function-related, and include
the "identity of [the] primary caretaker during the
marriage."
However, Pusey also states that another
factor is considered in the "identity of the parent with
whom the child has spent most of his or her time pending
custody determination if that period is lengthy." Id.
in Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988), the father
had custody of the child for over a year prior to trial
on the issue of a permanent custody award. The trial
court considered various factors, including that the
father had provided a stable environment and had been the
primary caretaker during the interim period. The Utah
Supreme Court affirmed the custody award to the father,
and stated that lf[i.]n considering competing claims to
custody between fit parents under the 'best interests of
the child' standard, considerable weight should be given
to which parent has been the child's primary caretaker"
prior to the divorce. Davis, 749 P.2d at 648 (emphasis
added)•
The Defendant/Appellant demonstrated not only the desire but
the actual ability to place his children's needs before his, to
make sacrifices of time and assets for his children and to provide
a stable, secure environment and home for his children during the
disruptions and separations caused by their parents' marital
discord. (T.151, T.152)
After Paryzek, supra. there have been a plethora of cases
which have affirmed the desire to maintain temporary custody
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arrangements if they have been functional, have met the needs of
the children and will continue to meet the best interests of the
children. Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990), Thronson v.
Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991), Cumminas v. Cumminasr 175
Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah Nov. 1991).

The Utah Court of Appeals has

even stated that as a matter of law permanent custody must be
awarded to the party who was the primary caretaker during the
pendency of the action. In Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah
App. 1990) at pages 1177 and 1178 the Court stated:
"In Paryzek v. Paryzek. 776 P.2d 78 (1989), this
court held that in custody decisions, a trial court must,
because of the child's need for stability, consider the
nature and duration of pre-existing custody arrangements.
Id. at 82. We also indicated that when the call is
otherwise close, this consideration may warrant awarding
permanent custody, as a matter of law, to the party who
was primary caretaker during the pendency of the divorce.
Id. at 83-84. In Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah
1988), the Utah Supreme Court stated that in a custody
dispute between fit parents, "considerable weight" should
be given to the identity of the primary caretaker. Id.
at 648. See also Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah
1986) (identity of parent with whom child has spent most
time pending divorce is fact to consider in custody
decision."
There is no dispute that the Defendant/Appellant nurtured the
children and met their emotional and physical needs during each of
the parties' separations.
Dr. Strassberg testified that the Defendant/Appellant was a
good parent who was not deficient in any way. (T.102)

He also

testified that the children would not be harmed in any way if the
Defendant/Appellant were awarded physical custody of the children.
(T.103)

Lastly, the evaluator testified that his recommendation

awarding permanent custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee was "a very
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close judgment call."

(T.103)

In refusing to award permanent

custody of the children to the Defendant/Appellant, the trial Court
clearly failed to follow the mandates of Paryzek.
Merriam.

Suprar and

Supra.

There was no compelling reason to change the temporary custody
situation.

However, as noted by the Defendant/Appellant in his

post-trial Motion for New Trial and Motion to Stay Proceedings, it
was imperative that the children not suffer another disruption in
their lives.

The trial Court erred in its award of permanent

custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee.

There was neither sufficient

evidence to support the trial Court's decision nor a convincing
consideration of the requirement to maintain a stable custodial
arrangement if possible.

The trial Court's decision resolving

custody is an illogical, specious abuse of discretion. This Court
should reverse the order granting the Plaintiff/Appellee permanent
custody.

C.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO AWARD CUSTODY TO THE CHILDREN'S
PRIMARY CARETAKER.

A multitude of cases have determined that a trial Court, when
articulating what type of custodial arrangement will satisfy the
child's best interest, must closely examine
factors."

"function-related

As stated in Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah

App. 1989) at page 87:
"To determine the best interests of the child, the
trial court must consider "function-related" factors,
which include:
the preference of the child; keeping siblings
together; the relative strength of the child's bond
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with one or both of the prospective custodians;
and, in appropriate cases, the general interest in
continuing
previously
determined
custody
arrangements where the child is happy and well
adjusted. Other factors related primarily to the
primary custodian's character or status or to their
capacity or willingness to function as parents:
moral character and emotional stability; duration
and depth of desire for custody; ability to provide
personal rather than surrogate care; significant
impairment of ability to function as a parent
through drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other
cause; reasons for having relinquished custody in
the past; religious compatibility with the child;
kinship, including, in extraordinary circumstances,
stepparent status; and financial condition. Id. at
973 (quoting Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38,
41 (Utah 1982).
This court has recognized that
some of the more significant factors, although not
dispositive, include the identity of the primary
caretaker during the marriage, the parent who has
the greatest flexibility to provide personal care
for the child, and the relative stability of the
environment each parent is capable of providing.
Id at 56."
Subsequent cases such as Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App.
1990), Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P. 2d 1172 (Utah App. 1991) and
Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991) have all
mandated identification of the primary caretaker utilizing function
related

criteria to formulate

a legally cognizable

award of

custody.
There is no dispute that the Defendant/Appellant provided the
greater amount of day-to-day care for the children during the
parties' initial separation.

The Plaintiff/Appellee would assist

in transporting the children to school and back and would assist in
doing some housework and laundry. (T.30, T.31, T.598, T.60, T.183)
Her primary, almost sole function, during the final separation was
to shuttle the children back and forth to school and to make
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certain

that

they

had

eaten

something

for

breakfast.

The

Plaintiff/Appellee testified that during the most recent separation
she did not cook, clean or do the laundry except infrequently.
(T.31) As she stated this time she was helping out her husband but
not caring for him. (T.32)

It is tragic that in attempting to

place the responsibility for the more tedious but critical element
of caring for the children onto her estranged husband she fails to
realize

that doing household

labors

for her

children

is of

significant benefit to the children and a large part of daily
parenting.
The

Defendant/Appellant

testified

that

having

the

Plaintiff/Appellee in the home often meant more work for him as he
would have to clean meals she left behind. (T.123, T.124)

The

Plaintiff/Appellee admits receiving letters complaining of the
condition in which she would leave the house after her daily
departures. (T.59)
The

Defendant/Appellant

has

demonstrated

an

ability

to

supervise and guide his children. The children have curfews. They
must have his permission to be away from home and they must inform
their father of their whereabouts. (T.129, T.130, T.145)

If the

children do not keep their curfews or inform their father of where
they will be, he grounds them. (T.130)

Neighbors, including a

witness called by the Plaintiff/Appellee, indicated the children
are well-supervised and cared for by a father who is at home as
much as possible. (T.ll, T.12, T.178)
The Defendant/Appellant testified he makes as much effort as
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possible to be with his children and assist them in all their
endeavors.

He has coached their teams, played sports with them,

and attended their games. (T.114, T.116, T.161, T.162, T.186)

He

has attended parent-teacher conferences and had additional meetings
with Adam's teachers because he was concerned about Adam's recent
academic performance.
parties

testified

(T.118, T.119, T.147, T.189, T.190)

that

the

Defendant/Appellant

assisted

Both
the

children with their homework. (T.60, T.119) The Plaintiff/Appellee
indicated at trial that the children were not doing as well in
school as they had been prior to the separation. However, she made
no attempts to arrange tutoring for the children. (T.49) Mr. Paul
Brennan, Adam's social studies teacher, testified that he had only
seen the Defendant/Appellant at parent-teacher conferences. (T.189)
He perceived the Defendant/Appellant to be a very concerned parent.
His assessment of Adam was ". . .he seems very stable, happy. His
scholastic work is exceptional." (T.190)
The

Defendant/Appellant

has

stated

concerns

that

the

Plaintiff/Appellee does not adequately supervise the children. The
Plaintiff/Appellee did not know where Adam was when Commissioner
Peuler

wished

to

Defendant/Appellant

speak

to

the

children.

(T.29)

The

testified that he knew of times when the

children were left alone unsupervised in the home overnight by the
Plaintiff/Appellee. (T.122)

Mr. Tenneson, a neighbor, recalled

seeing the Defendant/Appellant watching over his children from the
street at about 3 o'clock A.M. because the Plaintiff/Appellee was
not home. (T.176, T.177)
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The Defendant/Appellant demonstrated a willingness and ability
to spend

as much time as possible with his children.

The

Plaintiff/Appellee did not place as much significance on maximizing
the time she spent with the children.

She admitted she spent a

considerable amount of time during the weekends in Park City with
her boyfriend. (T.60) During the time the Defendant/Appellant had
custody

of

the

Plaintiff/Appellee

children

during

the

final

separation

the

exercised visitation only one or two full

weekends. (T.126, T.127, T.128)

She did not even request to have

the children with her during Thanksgiving

1991.

(161)

The

Plaintiff/Appellee chose to attend a concert at Park City rather
than attend a softball game on Jamie's birthday. (T.79) Any bond
between the children and their mother could not have been fostered
by her elective absences or her failure to spend as much time as
possible with the children.

The apparent increased focus on her

personal pursuits rather than spending time with the children were
noted both by the Defendant/Appellant and Mrs. Elma Barnes, the
children's paternal grandmother.

(T.81, T.84, T.85)

As the

Defendant/Appellant stated "She spent more time with them the first
time and she seemed a little closer to them." (T.126)
The Defendant/Appellant has demonstrated an ability to discuss
issues dealing with maturation, responsibility and ethics with his
children. (T.123, T.125, T.130, T.131)

He is a caring, patient,

competent parent. In contrast the testimony at trial indicated the
Plaintiff /Appellee was less pcitient with the children and that she
was also more likely to articulate comments which would cause pain
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to the childrenand harm their self-esteem, such as calling them
names, indicating they were couch potatoes and lazy . (T.81, T.84,
T.125)
There is not a single function, chore or undertaking the
Defendant/Appellant did not or would not undertake to meet the
needs of his children.

He clothed, fed, educated and loved them

during each of the parties7 separations.
Plaintiff/Appellee

No one has alleged the

does not love her children.

However, her

functioning as a parent has been much less active and significant
than that of the Defendant/Appellant.

No one even suggested the

children

in

did

not

Defendant/Appellant.
not

happy

and

thrive

while

the

care

of

the

No one ever suggested that the children were
well-adjusted

while

residing

with

the

Defendant/Appellant.
The trial Court completely ignored the parenting, functionrelated tasks performed by the Defendant/Appellant when issuing its
oral decision awarding custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee.

Judge

Frederick stated, "The Plaintiff's level of commitment to her
children during the course of this separation has exceeded that of
the Defendant and that's been established by their actions during
the course of the separation."
properly

identify

the

primary

The failure of the Court to
caretaker,

to

acknowledge

the

Defendant/Appellant's care of the children, and to declare the
Plaintiff/Appellee to have had a higher level of commitment to the
children was contrary to the holdings of cases designed to further
the best interests of children and was contrary to the evidence
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presented at trial.

As a clear abuse of the discretion given a

trial Court, the trial Court's custody decision should be reversed.

D.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADOPTED THE DECISION OF THE
CUSTODY EVALUATOR WITHOUT PROPER CONSIDERATION OF THE
FACTS EVIDENCED AT TRIAL.

Dr. Strassberg failed to make adequate inquiry into past and
current realities when he performed his custodial evaluation. Dr.
Strassberg was informed by the Defendant/Appellant of two separate
occasions when the Plaintiff/Appellee had suicidal ideations due to
the termination of extramarital affairs. (T.148, T.149)

However,

in his evaluation, Dr. Strassberg discusses only one instance when
the Plaintiff/Appellee had contemplated suicide. (T.95)
The Defendant/Appellant testified he informed Dr. Strassberg
that he believed the Plaintiff/Appellee's interest and ability to
parent

their

children

had

been

adversely

extramarital relationships. (T.150)

impacted

by

her

He also indicated that he

believed the children were upset when they met their mother's
boyfriends.

(T.150)

Strassberg

was

Despite

unconcerned

these articulated
about

the

extramarital affairs. (T.96, T.97, T.98)

concerns, Dr.

Plaintiff/Appellee's
This apparent lack of

concern is antithetical to the statutory mandates of § 30-3-10(1)
of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended and precedential case
law which states that a parent's morals are factors which the trial
Courts must consider in making an award of custody.

The custodial

evaluator was also "unconcerned" that the children would meet the
man or men with whom their mother was having an affair. (T.97,
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T.98)

It is incredulous that introducing minor, impressionable

children to their parent's lovers can be cavalierly dismissed as
having no relevance to the straying parent's ability to assess a
child's needs and to protect the child from additional anguish and
trauma or that these introductions will not traumatize children.
Dr. Strassberg's testimony at trial and his evaluation report
are

inconsistent.

He

based

his

recommendation

that

the

Plaintiff/Appellee be awarded custody because of the impressive
level of involvement with the children during the separation.
(T.103, Custody Evaluation)

However, at trial he identified the

Plaintiff/Appellee's involvement with her children to be ". . .
getting there early and getting the kids ready for school and was
often there when the kids got home from school until Steve returned
from work." (T.99) Later he minimized the efforts expended by the
Plaintiff/Appellee to parent the children.

He stated there was

very little involved in preparing breakfast for the children.
(T.99) He was also aware that the Plaintiff/Appellee would "often"
have

the

children

one

day

on

the

weekend.

(T.100)

The

Plaintiff/Appellee's concern and love for her children may have
been genuine but the efforts she expended to parent and have
contact with her children was minimal. The illusion was a caring,
committed active parent. The reality was parenting with the least
possible amount of effort only when it did not involve sublimating
or delaying the pursuit of her pleasures or inconveniencing the
Plaintiff/Appellee.

It

should

also

be

remembered

that

the

Plaintiff/Appellee utilized her access to the marital home to
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remove property which did not belong to her, to go through the
personal property of the Defendant/Appellant, and to leave dirty
dishes and messes for the Defendant/Appellant to clean. (T.50,
T.51# T.59, T.124, T.165)

The fatal inconsistencies between the

conclusion by the evaluator, the evaluator's testimony and the
facts created and fostered by the Plaintiff/Appellant during the
separation should have negated any great reliance being placed upon
the custody report and evaluation.
The evaluator made no efforts to interview or speak with
anyone related to the Defendant/Appellant.
Plaintiff/Appellee's

Several members of the

family were contacted.

(T.93, T.94)

Dr.

Strassberg made no effort to ascertain how much substantive real
parenting was done by the Plaintiff/Appellee. He made no effort to
determine why the Plaintiff/Appellee did not exercise more frequent
or more extended visitation. (T.99, T.100, T.101)
process was flawed.

The evaluation

It is only logical that the evaluator's

recommendation then is also fatally flawed.
The trial Court is granted a great deal of latitude to
determine custody.
1989).

Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P. 2d 78 (Utah App.

However, it is not the prerogative of the trial Court to

automatically adopt the recommendation of the custody evaluator.
The facts which could have been ascertained by Dr. Strassberg and
which should have been incorporated in his custody evaluation
should have properly considered the non-illusionary facts of the
temporary custody situation and the parenting activities of the
parties. The failure to do so tainted the evaluation process.
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It

was a clear abuse of the trial Court's broad discretion to adopt
the recommendations of Dr. Strassberg when the same were not
substantiated by any credible evidence.

It is not within the

prerogative of the trial Court to adopt flawed
untenable,

unconscionable

recommendations

analysis or

while

ignoring

compelling, often undisputed facts, which affected and defined the
best interests of these children. The adoption of Dr. Strassberg's
recommendation and the award of custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee
should be reversed.
E.

THE AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE
LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT.

Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 and 14 of the Amended Findings of Fact
and paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Amended Conclusions of the Law are
conclusionary, erroneous statements designed only to support the
trial Court's award of custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee.

They

lack substantiation in the trial transcript.
The evaluator determined that the Plaintiff/Appellee had the
emotional stability to be the custodial parent based upon the MMPI
scores. (T.90)
impermissibly

This conclusion is erroneous as the evaluator
disregarded

her extramarital

relationships, her

willingness to discuss these relationships with her children, and
the simple parenting she did in the minimal amount of time she
elected to give to the children. (T.97, T.99, T.100) The evidence
by the parties and the witnesses cast unrefuted qualms about the
Plaintiff/Appellee's fitness, character and emotional stability to
be the custodial parent.
Contrary to the assertion in paragraph 8 of the Amended
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Findings, the Court did not consider the "relative ability of
parents to provide care, supervision and suitable environment for
children. . .."

Had the Court done so it would not have modified

the existing lengthy, healthy temporary custody award.

This

allegation is conclusionary and contrary to the preponderance of
the evidence introduced at trial.
Roberts v. Roberts. 835 P.2d 193 (Utah App. 1992) sets for a
very explicit standard for that the trial Court must adhere to in
issuing legally sufficient Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
"Our threshold consideration on review is whether
the court's findings and conclusions are adequate. 'In
cases tried to the bench, the court is required to 'find
the facts specially' and thus ground its decision on
findings of fact which iresolved the material factual
uncertainties and are expressed in enough detail to
enable a reviewing court to determine whether they are
clearly erroneous.7 Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 848-49
(Utah App. 1989) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P.52(a)). '[T]o
ensure the court acted within its broad discretion, the
facts and reasons for the court's decision must be set
forth fully in appropriate findings and conclusions.'
Painter v. Painter, 752 P. 2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988)
(citations omitted); accord Linam v. King, 804 P.2d 1235,
1237 (Utah App. 1991). These findings must be adequate
to ensure on appeal 'that the trail court's discretionary
determination was rationally based.' Painter, 752 P. 2d at
909 (quoting Martinez v. Martinez. 728 P. 2d 994 (Utah
1986)).
Specifically of findings is particularly
important in custody determinations. This is so because
the issues involved are highly fact sensitive.
We will not disturb a trial court's custody
determination if it is consistent with the standards set
by appellate courts and supported by adequate findings of
fact and conclusions of law. Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776
P.2d 78, 83 (Utah App. 1989).
The legal standards
applied by the appellate courts are based on Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-10(1) (1989), which requires the trial court
to consider the best interests of the child and the past
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the
parties.' The appellate courts have emphasized a number
of 'function related' feictors that are criteria for the
trial court to consider in determining which custody
arrangement will meet the minor child's best interests.
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Unlike support and alimony determinations, which can be
made by relatively simple quantitative analysis, there is
no checklist of custody factors, since '[t]hese factors
are highly personal and individual, and do not lend
themselves to the means of generation employed in other
areas of the law,' Moon v. Moon, 790, P.2d 52, 54 (Utah
App. 1990). Consequently, when custody is contested and
evidence presents several possible interpretations, a
bare conclusory recitation of factors and statutory terms
will not suffice. We must have the necessary supporting
factual findings linking those factors to the children's
best interests and each parent's abilities to meet the
children's needs. See Painter, 752 P.2d at 909.
[I]f our review of custody determinations is to be
anything more than a superficial exercise of
judicial power, the record on review must contain
written findings of fact and conclusions of law by
the trial judge which specifically set forth the
reasons, based on those numerous factors which must
be weighted in determining the 'best interests of
the child,' and which support the custody decision.
Smith v. Smith 726 P.2d 423, 425 (Utah 1986); cf. Ebbert
v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah App. 1987) (specific
findings not required when custody is not contested),
cet. denied. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
In the instant case, the trial court made two
conclusions of law referring to its findings, and
summarized its findings on the custody issue as follows:
a.
That both parties are capable of providing
care of the minor children.
b.
That both parties have participated in acts
that bear on their moral character, to-wit: [Wife]
with the ZCMI incident and [Husband] with the
incident at the bar. Further, the court finds that
the incident at the bar did in fact take place and
that [Husband] was less than candid in his
testimony given to the court regarding the same.
c.
That [Husband] has physically abused [Wife]
during the marriage.
d.
That although [Husband] has had custody of the
minor children since 1990; since that period of
time is not substantial the court has not given it
a great deal of weight.
e.
That both parties have a desire for custody
and a bonding with the children.
f.
That [Wife] was primary caretaker of the minor
children during the marriage and prior to the
separation in January, 1990.
g.
That [Wife] is far more amenable to giving
liberal visitation to [Husband] than [Husband]
would be to [Wife].
h.
That [Wife] has 29
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[Husband] based upon her being the primary
caretaker.
i.
That it is in the best interests of the
children that [Wife] be awarded the sole care,
custody and control of the two (2) minor children
of the parties.
These findings are inadequate to guide us in
assessing the correctness of the court's custody
determination. The last finding on the children's best
interests is merely a conclusion of law.
From the
remaining findings, it is impossible to divine how the
court reached its final legal conclusion.
In their
evidentiary presentations, the parties made much of moral
character.
'Moral
standards'
are
a
statutory
consideration, Utah Code Ann. § 20-2-10 (1989), and may
be relevant to a custody determination to the extent they
affect the children's best interests. See Sanderson v.
Tryson, 739 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1987).
However, the
concept of fault, unrelated to the children's best
interests, is irrelevant to the custody decision. See
Mar chant v. Marchant, 743 P. 2d 199, 203 (Utah App. 1987).
The court's finding on moral character in this case
states that 'both parties have participated in acts that
bear on their moral character,' and then proceeds to cite
specific examples. This statement gives no guidance
regarding how those acts bear on the parties' parenting
abilities or affect the children's best interests. Nor
does it indicate the relative morality of the parties'
acts, if the specified acts do bear on the parties'
parenting abilities. The court may be implying that
Wife's extramarital sexual act in the public parking
terrace is of equal gravity to Husband's request for
women's phone numbers at a bar, six months following the
parties' separation and divorce filing. If so, it fails
to say so. The court's statement that Husband 'was less
than candid' renders the finding more problematic. Does
the lack of candor somehow affect Husband's moral
character or was the trial court making a credibility
finding.' If the court was concerned about credibility,
does this mean that the court did not believe Husband's
testimony regarding the bar incident or did not believe
any of his testimony for lack of candor?
The court may have considered other factors as
bearing on moral character.
If so, it failed to
enumerate what those other facts were. We believe that
Husband's abusive conduct toward Wife could be relevant
to moral character. See Marchant, 743 P.2d at 2093-04 &
n.3 ('neither this court nor any other court can excuse
or justify or approve intrafamily violence or spouse
abuse').
However, the court's sole and conclusory
finding on abuse, ' [Husband] has physically abused [Wife]
during the marriage,' is not included in the court's
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finding on moral character.
If the court considered
abuse or any other factor in its calculation of moral
character, it should have clearly so indicated.
Alternatively, the court could have tied its finding of
abuse directly to the children's best interests by, for
example, finding a pattern of abuse beyond the one
culminating incident to which Husband admitted. Absent
specific subsidiary findings addressing these concerns we
have no way of knowing on appeal how the court's finding
on moral character weighs in relation to its scanty
findings favoring its outcome. Absent factual findings
specifically setting forth the basis for the court's
custody determination, we are at a loss to determine
whether the court abused its discretion in the custody
award. See Smith, 726 P.2d at 426 ('Proper findings of
fact ensure that the ultimate custody award follows
logically form, and is supported by, the evidence and the
controlling legal principles.'). Thus, we remand for
more detailed findings. Having made this determination,
we do not reach Husband's further contention that the
evidence was insufficient to support the findings and
that the court abused its discretion in its final
determination awarding custody to Wife."
The dicta in Roberts, supra. is unfortunately applicable in
this matter.

The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

do not refer to any evidence or testimony from this trial which was
fact specific to this case or which clearly sets forth supportable
rationale for the trial Court's custody decision.

The Amended

Findings of Fact are also violative of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. No facts incidental to this particular action
are cited in the Amended Findings of Fact.

However, it is not

necessary for this matter to be remanded for additional proceedings
as there is sufficient credible and compelling evidence to reverse
the trial Court's award of custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee.
II.

THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY TO THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE.
It has been long established that the trial Court must find

sufficient legal reasons to order alimony.

In 1985 the Utah
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Supreme Court reaffirmed the controlling criteria which must be
satisfied before there can be a proper award of alimony.

In Jones

v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) at 1075. The Court stated:
"This Court has described the purpose of alimony:
'[T]he most important function of alimony is to provide
support for the wife as nearly as possible at the
standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and to
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge.' English
v. English 565 P.2d at 411. With this purpose in mind,
the Court in English articulated three factors that must
be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award:
(1) the financial conditions and needs of the wife;
(2) the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and
(3) the ability of the husband to provide
support."
A multitude of cases decided after Jones, supra, have held
that a trial Court's failure to consider these three factors is
reversible error.

In Chambers v. Chambers, 198 Utah Adv. Rep 49

(Utah App. October 21, 1992) Judge Russon for the Court of Appeals
stated:
"The trial court is given considerable discretion to
provide for spousal support, and such an award will not
be overturned on appeal unless there has been a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion. Paffel v. Paffel, 732
P. 2d 96, 100 *Utah 1986); accord Rasband v. Rasband, 752
P. 2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988).
In Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P. 2d 84 (Utah App.
1989), we outlined the facts to be considered by a trial
court in determining alimony: '(1) the financial
conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the
ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient
income for him or herself; and (3) the ability of the
responding spouse to provide support.' Id. at 90
(citations omitted). 'If these three factors have been
considered, we will not disturb the trial court's alimony
award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to
manifest a clear abuse of discretion.' Id. (citations
omitted). Moreover, 'in considering these factors, the
trial court is required to make adequate factual findings
on all material issues, unless the facts in the record
are 'clear, incontroverted, and capable of supporting
only a finding in favor of the judgment.' ' Haumont v.
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Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah App. 1990) quoting
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah
App. 1988), quoting Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999
(Utah 1987)."
The trial Court in this instance failed to consider any of the
factors enumerated

in Jones. supra or Chambers, infra.

The

Plaintiff/Appellee worked a flexible schedule for her employer.
According to her testimony, she worked between twenty and twentyfive

hours

per

week.

(T.14,

T.45)

However,

both

the

Plaintiff/Appellee and a co-worker who testified on her behalf
admitted that the option to work full time was available.

In fact

when the Plaintiff/Appellee needed some money to pay attorney fees
she did work full time. (T.6-, T.8, T.48, T.49)
The Plaintiff/Appellee did not testify regarding her hourly
rate of pay at the time of trial. Nor did she provide any current
information which would verify her present earnings or her total
year-to-date income. The trial Court utilized the income shown by
the Plaintiff/Appellee on the Financial Declaration Sheet that she
had

submitted

to

the

Court

several

months

calculation of child support. (T.133, T.135)

earlier

for the

There is absolutely

no indication of what evidence the trial Court utilized to assess
the Plaintiff/Appellee,s income for the purpose of establishing her
alleged need for alimony other than her testimony that she would
guess her monthly earnings were "right around" Nine Hundred Dollars
($900.00) per month.
Absent

any credible evidence of the

Plaintiff/Appellee's

actual income, the Court had no plausible means of determining what
the Plaintiff/Appellee's needs were.

All the trial Court could
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possibly have known for certain was that the Plaintiff/Appellee
believed the mortgage on the parties7 marital home required an
expenditure of more than half of her gross check, (T.16)
The Plaintiff/Appellee stated she needed alimony to help with
the house payment, food and to take care of the children. (T.16)
The Plaintiff/Appellee did not have a significant amount of marital
debts to pay as a result of the parties7 division of marital debts.
Unlike

the

situation

relatively debt free.

in

many

divorces,

these

parties

were

The only numerical calculation that could

have been made of the Plaintiff/Appellee's monthly expenses was an
inflated, speculation of what her monthly expenses might be if she
were to regain custody which she delineated on her Financial
Declaration Sheet.

There was absolutely no evidence or credible

testimony

as

to

the

Plaintiff/Appellee's

realistic

monthly

expenses.

It is sheer folly to determine that Plaintiff/Appellee

needed alimony without any credible evidence of what were her
actual needs.
The

trial

Court

did

nothing

to

assess

what

the

Plaintiff/Appellee could earn if she were required to work full
time.

The

trial

Court

also

failed

to

determine

what

the

Plaintiff/Appellee would earn if income that could be earned by
working full time were imputed to her even if she were to elect to
work part time.

However, utilizing what the Plaintiff/Appellee

reported as her hourly rate of pay was, it can be calculated that
her gross monthly income, computed in the same manner as gross
monthly income for child support purposes, would be One Thousand
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Six Hundred Forty-Two Dollars and Sixty Cents ($1,462.60).

The

higher

the

figure

should

have

been

utilized

in

calculating

Plaintiff/Appellee's gross monthly income as it is not unreasonable
to expect the Plaintiff/Appellee to have first maximized her
earning potential before determining there was a need for alimony.
The

trial

court

did

not,

as

is

required,

make

any

determination which is supported by the record on appeal, that the
Plaintiff/Appellee did not have the ability to produce a sufficient
income for herself. Rather, the trial court accepted at face value
the absurd position of the Plaintiff/Appellee that she needed to
work part time in order to be able to supervise her children.
(T.16)

It

had

already

been

demonstrated

that

the

Plaintiff/Appellee lacked the ability to adequately supervise her
children when she was the custodial parent and working part time.
(T.29, T.121, T.122, T.179)

Additionally,

children were in school full time.

all the parties'

The amount of time they

"needed" supervision was minimal. The "need" to work part time in
order to supervise children, who were not rowdy or troublemakers,
also ignores the reality of the Defendant/Appellant's ability to
more than adequately supervise his children while working full
time.

It is likely that most custodial parents of school age

children work full time. It is not unreasonable to expect healthy
able-bodied individuals, such as the

Plaintiff/Appellee, to work

full time to support themselves even though for whatever reason
they would, if they could, choose to work part time.

The trial

Court effectively awarded the Plaintiff/Appellee for expressing her
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desire

to

work

part

time

while

being

punitive

to

the

Defendant/Appellant because he, who had no genuine alternative,
worked full time.

The refusal to insist the Plaintiff/Appellee

accept full-time employment and the refusal to base any initial
determination of her need for alimony after assessing her ability
to be self-sufficient as if she had wisely become employed full
time, whether or not she continued to insist upon the right to be
underemployed, is clearly violative of controlling case law.

The

Plaintiff/Appellee should hcive been expected to work full time.
Her ability to produce sufficient income for herself should have
been viewed as if she accented the option available from her
employer to work full time.
The trial Court absolutely failed to consider the ability of
the

Defendant/Appellant

to

pay

alimony.

Clearly,

the

Plaintiff/Appellee's choice to work only part time was a luxury
these parties could not afford. The Defendant/Appellant testified
at trial that he worked forty hours per week. He was paid Thirteen
Dollars and Ninety-Five Cents ($13.95/hr.) per hour. (T.131, T.132)
His 1991 W-2 form was also introduced into evidence (Ex. 1, Ex.2)
Computation of the Defendant/Appellant's gross monthly income,
pursuant to the means utilized for calculating gross monthly income
for

child

support

purposes,

unarguably

established

the

Defendant/Appellant's gross monthly income to Two Thousand Three
Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars ($2,399.00). Had the trial Court even
calculated the Defendant/Appellant's gross monthly income after the
deduction of her child support obligation and compared it to the
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Plaintiff/Appellee's gross monthly income, based upon full-time
employment, it would have been clear there was no genuine or
overwhelming disparity in incomes. The Defendant/Appellant's gross
monthly income after deduction of child support only is One
Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars

($1,835.00).

The

Plaintiff/Appellee's earnings if employed would be One Thousand Six
Hundred Forty-Two Dollars ($1,642.00).

Not only does this proper

calculation show near parity between the parties' realistic gross
monthly

income,

it

obliviates

any

claim

that

the

Defendant/Appellant had the ability to pay alimony and the claim
that the Plaintiff/Appellee had the need for alimony.
the

Plaintiff/Appellee

is

able

to

meet

her

Defendant/Appellant cannot meet his living expenses.

Now while

needs,

the

The refusal

of the trial Court to accurately examine the Plaintiff/Appellee's
need for alimony pursuant to the formula adopted in Jones, supra,
and ratified in Chambers, supra, was clearly violated. The trial
Court ignored established, controlling precedent and abused its
discretion.
reversed.

The award of alimony by the trial Court should be

Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991).

Neither

the

Amended

Findings

of

Fact

nor

the

Amended

Conclusions of Law make any reference to the Defendant/Appellant's
ability to pay alimony.

There is absolutely no mention of the

Plaintiff/Appellee's ability to provide a sufficient income for
herself. There is only one conclusionary statement in paragraph 19
of the Amended Findings of Fact that mentions the need of the
Plaintiff/Appellee for alimony. Even the oral decision rendered by
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the trial Court failed to address any facts which would support a
legally cognizable award of alimony to the Plaintiff/Appellee.
(T.200).

The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are

woefully insufficient. Chambers v. Chambers. 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 49
(Utah October 21, 1992), at page 49, articulated what must be
contained in final divorce documents

to be legally sufficient:

"This finding is insufficient.
See Morgan v.
Morgan, 795 P. 2d 684, 689 (Utah App. 1990); Johnson v.
Johnson, 771 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah App. 1989); Marchant v.
Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 207 (Utah App. 1987). Contrary
to the second prong of Schindler. the trial court's
findings do not address Mrs. Chambers's level of
education, health, and other matters concerning her
immediate or eventual employability. Moreover, without
further explanation, the court's blanket reference to
'substantial income from assets that have been awarded to
her7 is inadequate to justify the court's reduction of
alimony. Without more, we cannot determine whether such
reduction constituted an abuse of discretion. Lastly, as
to the third prong of Schindlerf the court must do more
than simply state that 'the defendant has the ability to
pay.' Given the amount of conflicting evidence on these
facts, the trial court's award of alimony must be
reversed and remanded for further findings."
Watson v. Watson, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah July 2, 1992).

The

trial Court's award of alimony to the Plaintiff/Appellee must be
reversed as there is absolutely nothing in the record which
supports the same.
III. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THE AMOUNT OF THE
DEFENDANT'S RETIREMENT MONIES
At trial there was virtually no disagreement between the
parties as to the amount of retirement monies in existence at the
time

of

their

separation.

They

each

agreed

that

the

Defendant/Appellant had received retirement monies approximately a
year or more prior to the separation. (T.18, T.140) Each testified
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that some of the money received had been expended for marital
purposes prior

to the separation.

(T.18, T.19#

T.140)

The

Defendant/Appellant testified there was approximately Ten Thousand
Dollars

($10,000.00)

separated. (T.140)

of

retirement

monies

when

the

parties

The Plaintiff/Appellee testified she believed

there was Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) of retirement monies
when the parties' separated. (T.19)
indicates

no

disagreement

The testimony of each party

about

the

amount

of

the

Defendant/Appellant's remaining money when the parties separated.
Additionally,

the

Defendant/Appellant

testified

he

made

expenditures from this retirement monies during the pendency of the
action. (T.140)
The Defendant/Appellant testified that he had no objection to
dividing the retirement monies that were in existence with the
Plaintiff/Appellee.

(T.140)

His agreement to divide the monies

existing at the date of trial is in full accord with controlling
case law.

In Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991) at

page 1211 the Appellate Court stated:
"The value of marital property is determined as of
the time of the divorce decree or trial. Fletcher v.
Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 (Utah 1980). See also
Beraer v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985). The
reason for the rule is that fl[b]y the very nature of a
property division, the marital estate is evaluated
according to what property exists at the time the
marriage is terminated." Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610
P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). Courts can, however, in the
exercise of their equitable powers, use a different date,
such as the date of separation, if one party has "acted
obstructively,. . ." Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052
(Utah Ct.App. 1987).
Judge

Frederick

ordered

the

parties

to
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divide

the

Defendant/Appellant savings accounts and I.R.A. Accounts. (T.196).
While still presiding over the trial he further classified the
division of the Defendant/Appellant's retirement monies to include
the monies existing at the time of separation

(T.200)

minus

expenditures made by the Defendant/Appellant during the pendency of
the action. (T.201, T.202). The Defendant/Appellant has no quarrel
with this division.
After

trial

the

issue

of

the

division

of

the

Defendant/Appellant's retirement account again became an issue.
The Plaintiff/Appellee would not accept the accounting made of the
retirement monies subsequent to the date of their final separation.
Counsel for the Plaintiff/Appellee prepared proposed final divorce
documents which purported to give the Plaintiff/Appellee more of
the

retirement

monies

thcin

were

actually

due

her.

The

Defendant/Appellant filed an objection to the proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The Court denied these objections.

On February 26, 1992, the Defendant/Appellant filed a Motion
for

Reconsideration

Affidavit.

of

Unresolved

Issues

and

a

supporting

He verified the retirement monies in existence at the

date of the parties7 separation and the amounts expended during the
pendency of the action.

By Minute Entry Order March 3, 1992, the

trial Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

As a result of

this erroneous decision the trial Court granted permission to the
Plaintiff/Appellee to have entered Findings of Fact, specifically
paragraph 21, and Conclusions of Law, specifically paragraph 15,
which were factually erroneous and not supported by evidence
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elicited at trial. The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law should be deemed legally insufficient and erroneous.

The

ordered division of the Fourteen Thousand Dollars ($14,000.00), the
amount originally in the Defendant/Appellant's retirement account,
should be reversed.
The trial

Court's

division

of the

Defendant/Appellant's

retirement monies as stated in the Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and the Second Amended Decree of Divorce is a
gross misapplication of the law which resulted in a clear abuse of
the Court's discretion as well as creating a serious inequity. The
presumption of the validity of the trial Court's decision as
referred to in Watson v. Watson, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, (Utah July
2, 1992) is not present in this situation.

As noted in Watson,

supra, reversal of the trial Court's decision is necessary when
there is a misapplication of the law.
"'There is no fixed formula upon which to determine
a division of properties in a divorce action[.]' Naranio
v. Naranio. 751 P. 2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988)
(citation omitted).
We afford the trial court
'considerable latitude in adjusting financial and
property interests, and its actions are entitled to a
presumption of validity.' Jd. (citation omitted).
Accordingly, changes will be made in a trial court's
property division determination in a divorce action 'only
if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the
law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the
evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion.' Jd. (citations omitted)."
Watson, supra. page 44.

The parties should be ordered to divide

the Defendant/Appellant's retirement monies in accordance with the
accounting he provided the Plaintiff/Appellee and the trial Court.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXECUTING LEGALLY
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INSUFFICIENT

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Considerable discussion has been previously undertaken to
clearly identify the facts which do not support the rulings of the
trial Court, and which do not substantiate the trial Court's
resolution

of

custody,

Defendant/Appellant's

alimony

retirement

and

the

monies.

division
The

ill

of

the

founded,

egregious decisions of the trial Court were further compounded by
the execution and entry of legally insufficient Amended Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law. Read alone without any access to the
record of the trial proceedings the Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law give not one iota of fact or extrapolative
rationale to allow any understanding of why the trial Court ruled
in the manner it did. The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law violate Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as
the facts established at trial are not stated specially.
The Court of Appeals in Woodward v. Fazzio, 175 Utah Adv. Rep.
70 (Utah December 1991) at page 72 set forth what Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law must do minimally to be legally sufficient:
"Although the trial court's findings of fact
constitute a full three* pages of text, they nonetheless
provide an inadequate account of the actual facts
supporting the court's ultimate decision. Most of the
'findings' are conclusory, and reflect an intention to
merge the trial court's ultimate factual determinations
with the requirements of the Wuffenstein test, and as
such are more akin to conclusions of law. See Vigil, 164
Utah Adv. Rep. at 30. Finding of Fact #7, for instance,
states that '[appellant's] contacts with the child have
been inconsistent, sporadic and token,' that 'it is
evident to the court that the natural Father has
abdicated his responsibility as a parent,' and that 'the
court is convinced that the father's conduct has let to
the destruction of the parent/child relationship.' These
conclusory statements provide no insight into the
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evidentiary basis for the trial court's decision and
render effective appellate review unfeasible. See Adams
v. Board of Review, 173 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, (Utah Ct. App.
Nov. 5, 1991). The issue before the court was whether
Fazzio had abandoned R.A.F.; accordingly, the findings
should have set forth specific facts—subsidiary facts—
bearing on that issue.
The conclusory statement in
Findings of Fact #7, 8, 10, and 11 do not provide this
information and are therefore inadequate.
Unless the record 'clearly and uncontrovertedly
support[s]' the trial court's decision, the absence of
adequate findings of fact ordinarily requires remand for
more detailed findings by the trial court. Acton, 737
P. 2d at 999. See also Lovegren, 798 P. 2d at 770-71
(remand necessary when facts disputed). But see State v.
Ramirez. 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 15 & n.6 (Utah 1991)
(suggesting same liberalization of Acton's requirement of
express findings even absent uncontroverted evidence).
We have canvassed the record in the instant case and
find disputed evidence, making affirmance as a matter of
law impossible.
Cf.. Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 n.10
(absence of adequate findings is harmless when facts
concerning an issue are undisputed).
There was
conflicting testimony about the frequency and duration of
Fazzio's visits with the child, his treatment of the
child during those visits, Woodward's attempts to prevent
Fazzio from visiting with the child, Fazzio's payment of
child support, and Fazzio7s provision of gifts to the
child—all facts crucial to the validity of the court's
ultimate decision that Fazzio's conduct had destroyed the
parent-child relationship.
See Adams, slip op. at 8
('When multiple conflicting versions of the facts create
a matrix of possible factual findings, we are unable on
appeal to assume that any given finding was in fact
made.')
The trial court's findings of fact should resolve
these conflicts unequivocally, by stating the specific
subsidiary facts as the trial court found them. The
findings should set forth, with as much precision as
possible, the number of times Fazzio visited the child
during particular periods; the length of each of the
visits; the number of visits Woodward intentionally
prevented; the sums Fazzio provided as child support,
either personally or through his parents; the number and
type of gifts Fazzio gave them; and the specific
statements, acts, or omissions that demonstrate Fazzio's
intent to either accept or disregard his obligations as
a parent (e.g., instances of appellant performing child
care functions like changing his diaper or feeding him,
denying that the child was his responsibility, etc.).
Further, the findings should explicitly address the
impact Woodward's frequent relocation had on Fazzio's
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ability to maintain contact with the child, the effect
Fazzio's living and working outside Utah had on his
visitation, the manner and effect of any refusal on
Fazzio's part to legally acknowledge his paternity, and
any other factors bearing on whether Fazzio consciously
disregarded the child to such an extent that the parentchild relationship was destroyed. The court's findings
as to these issues should be set forth specifically and
should correspond to th€* factual evidence upon which the
court relied.
Once we possess this information, we can
meaningfully evaluate whether the visits have been
sporadic, the child support payments insufficient,
Fazzio7s conduct unacceptable, and, ultimately, whether
Fazzio abandoned the child. Accordingly, we remand for
more detailed findings by the trial court.
'We do not intend our remand to be merely an
exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion
already reached.' Allred v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108, 1112
(Utah 1990)."
Utah's appellate Courts have not allowed insufficient and
inadequate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to resolve
important, fact sensitive issues. This sound policy and precedence
should not be ignored or abolished.

The decision of the trial

Court should be reversed.
V.

THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL.
The trial Court in its ruling at trial ordered the deduction

of

expenditures

for

legitimate

marital

Defendant/Appellant's retirement monies.

obligation

from

the

Implicit in this Order

was the requirement that the Defendant/Appellant make an accounting
of the expenditures from these funds.

He indeed did provide an

accounting of the expenditures and validly made to satisfy joint
marital obligations.
The Plaintiff/Appellee would not accept this accounting. The
Defendant/Appellant then sought the assistance of the trial Court
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to resolve this impasse.

Rather than resolving the conflict and

aiding the parties' to resolve their differences

and ensure

implementation of its ruling the trial Court shirked its duty and
responsibility

and

denied

the Motion

for Reconsideration

of

Unresolved Issues. The Trial Court seriously abused its discretion
when it denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Unresolved Issues.
The

Defendant/Appellant

brought

a Motion

for

New Trial

pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The

rationale for the Motion, which sought a rehearing on the issues of
custody,

alimony

and

division

of

the

retirement monies, was the insufficiency
substantiate the trial Court's rulings.

Defendant/Appellant's
of the evidence to
This Motion, too, was

denied by the trial Court.
In

yet

one

more

instance

the

trial

Court

abused

its

discretion. As stated in Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah
App. 1989) at pages 84 and 85 the appellate Court discusses the
necessity of trial Court's acting within its discretion and within
the parameters of applicable rules and controlling case law:
"The decision to grant a new trial lies largely
within the trial court's discretion. State v. Brown. 771
P.2d 1093, 1095 (Ct. App.1989). However, the trial court
has no discretion to grant a new trial unless the moving
party shows at least one of the circumstances specified
in Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Moon
Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasysterns W. Constructors. Inc.f
767 P.2d
125, 128
(Utah Ct.App. 1988).
These
circumstances include, among others, '[a]ccident or
surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against'; '[n]ewly discovered evidence, material for the
party making the application, which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the
trial'; and 'insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision.' Utah R. Civ. P.59(a)(3),
(4), and (6). So long as such a showing is not made, we
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will not reverse the trial court's decision on a motion
for a new trial absent a clear abuse of discretion.
Brown, 771 P.2d at 1095; Moon Lake Electrical Ass'n. 767
P.2d at 128."
Ad nauseam recitation of the facts should not be necessary to
remind this Court of the rulings of the trial Court which are not
supported by the evidence or controlling case law.
viable,

stable

temporary

custody

arrangement

Dismantling a

for

no

clearly

articulated reason, requiring a party who could not afford to pay
alimony to a party who declined to work full time, and declaring an
excessive value

of

an asset

to be divided

are

all

legally

indefensible and not even remotely justified by the evidence at
trial.

The refusal to grant a new trial was a clearly improper

abuse of discretion.

The Defendant/Appellant would prefer that

there be no remand of this matter, but that this Court merely
reverse the decision of the trial Court, as he believes the delay
which would be unavoidable while awaiting a new trial could cause
irreparable harm to his children and seriously jeopardize his
ability to climb out of the abysmal financial situation in which he
finds himself.

Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744 (Utah App. 1991).
CONCLUSION

The Defendant/Appellant believes the trial Court repeatedly
committed reversible error and imposed many manifest injustices
upon him.

He respectfully requests the trial Court's award of

custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee, the award of alimony to the
Plaintiff/Appellee and the ordered division of the wrong amounts of
his retirement monies be reversed.
The trial Court abused its discretion when it summarily
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adopted the fatally flawed recommendation of the custody evaluator.
The trial Court failed to honor its obligation to be the trier of
fact and consider all the evidence presented it when it adopted the
recommendation

of

the

evaluator

without

considering

all the

evidence presented and without making an award of custody premised
upon the preponderance of credible facts introduced at trial. The
trial Court, without justification, terminated a temporary custody
award which provided the children a stable, functional custodial
situation.

There was a total failure on the part of the trial

Court to identify the best interests of these children and to make
an award of permanent custody which would meet the existing,
ongoing

and

future

best

interests

of

the

children.

The

Plaintiff/Appellee had in the past given de facto custody of the
parties'

minor

children

for

eighteen

months

to

the

Defendant/Appellant without making any formal legal claim asserting
her fitness to be the custodial parent.

The Defendant/Appellant

demonstrated his desire and ability to be the custodial parent
during

each

of

the

parties7

separations.

The

trial

Court

completely disregarded the Plaintiff/Appellee's unwillingness to be
a

dedicated

parent

who

would

exercise

visitation

at

every

opportunity, assist the children with their homework, attend parent
teacher conferences, be present at their sporting events, birthdays
and

holidays.

The

Defendant/Appellant,

unlike

the

Plaintiff/Appellee, was able to repeatedly translate his deep love
and concern for his children into actions which demonstrated his
love and caring, and which substantiated his ability to identify
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and satisfy his children's best needs and interests.

There is no

evidence which supports the trial Court's custody award.
The Defendant/Appellant's net monthly income after the payment
of his child support and alimony is insufficient to allow him to
rent an apartment or meet other basic expenses. Yet he is expected
to

work

full

Unaccountably

time
the

to

support

his

children

Plaintiff/Appellee,

who

and

had

ex-wife.
an

equal

responsibility to help support her children and who can be expected
to attempt to be self-supporting, was not required to work full
time to meet her financial obligations. The trial Court's award of
allimony

is

antithetical

to

prevailing

case

law.

It

is

unconscionable and untenable.
The trial Court ordered the parties' to divide an asset which
neither existed at the time of the parties' separation or at trial.
The parties agreed that there was Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00)
in retirement monies when th€*y separated. However, the trial Court
ordered them to divide Fourteen Thousand Dollars ($14,000.00). The
division of an asset which did not exist is not only irresponsible
it is clearly erroneous. The trial Court was given evidence by the
Defendant/Appellant, at trial and in his post-trial matters of the
amount of retirement monies when the parties' separated, on the
date of trial and of the expenditures for marital obligations and
reimbursable expenditures therefrom. The disregard of the evidence
was a prejudicial abuse of discretion.
The

trial

Court

executed

Amended

Findings

of

Fact and

Conclusions of Law which neither relied upon the evidence and
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testimony introduced at trial nor explained the rationale for its
decisions.

It then compounded this abuse of discretion, to the

detriment of the parties' children and the Defendant/Appellant, by
its

refusal

to

rectify

its

errors

when

it

denied

the

Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Reconsider Unresolved Issues, his
Motion to Stay Its Decision and his Motion for New Trial.

The

trial Court's rulings should neither be afforded the presumption of
validity, nor the presumption of being well considered, legally
cognizable or being supported by credible facts, testimony and
evidence.

A reversal and rejection of the trial Court's decision

is mandated and fervently requested.
Respectfully submitted this ^OJday

of December 1992.

CAROLYN/pRISCOLL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
The undersigned hereby certifies that four copies of the
Defendant/Appellant's brief and addendum were hand-delivered on the
_J^gJday of December 1992, to Stuart Hinckley, the attorney for
the Plaintiff/Appellee, 265 East 100 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111.
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